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This paper presents a simple yet effective method for transforming Boolean
functions that do not satisfy the strict avalanche criterion (SAC) into ones
that satisfy the criterion. Such a method has a wide range of applications
in designing cryptographically strong functions, including substitution boxes
(S-boxes) employed by common key block encryption algorithms.
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1 The Strict Avalanche Criterion
A (Boolean) function on Vn, where Vn denotes the vector space of n-tuples of elements
from GF (2), is said to satisfy the strict avalanche criterion (SAC) if complementing
a single bit in its input results in the output of the function being complemented half
the time over all the input vectors. The SAC is a very important requirement for
∗The first author was supported in part by the Australian Research Council under the reference
numbers A49130102, A49131885 and A49232172, the second author by A49130102, and the third
author by A49232172. All authors were supported by a University of Wollongong Research Program
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cryptographic functions. The formal definition for the SAC is due to Webster and
Tavares, and appeared first in 1985 [Web85, WT86]:
Definition 1 Let f be a function on Vn. f is said to satisfy the SAC if f(x)⊕f(x⊕α)
assumes the values zero and one an equal number of times, or simply, f(x)⊕f(x⊕α)
is balanced, for every α ∈ Vn with W (α) = 1, where x = (x1, . . . , xn) and W (α)
denotes the number of ones in (or the Hamming weight of) the vector α.
A closely related concept is propagation criterion [AT90, PLL+91, PGV91]:
Definition 2 Let f be a function on Vn. We say that f satisfies
1. the propagation criterion with respect to a non-zero vector α in Vn if f(x) ⊕
f(x⊕ α) is a balanced function.
2. the propagation criterion of degree k if it satisfies the propagation criterion with
respect to all α ∈ Vn with 1 <= W (α) <= k.
As the SAC is equivalent to the propagation criterion of degree 1, the latter can
be viewed as a generalization of the former. In another direction, the SAC has been
generalized to higher order SAC. This work is represented by [For89]. In this paper
we shall not pursue further the developments in these two directions. Instead we shall
focus our attention on how to transform functions which do not satisfy the SAC into
ones that satisfy the criterion.
2 Single Functions
First we introduce the following basic theorem.
Theorem 1 Let f be a function on Vn, and A be a nondegenerate matrix of order n
whose entries are from GF (2). Suppose that f(x)⊕f(x⊕γi) is balanced for each row
γi of A, where i = 1, . . . , n and x = (x1, . . . , xn). Namely f satisfies the propagation
criterion with respect to all rows of A. Then ψ(x) = f(xA) satisfies the SAC.
Proof. Let δi be a vector in Vn whose entries, except the ith, are all zero. Note
that W (δi) = 1 and δiA = γi, i = 1, . . . , n. Then we have ψ(x) ⊕ ψ(x ⊕ δi) =
f(xA)⊕ f((x⊕ δi)A) = f(u)⊕ f(u⊕ γi), where u = xA. Since A is nondegenerate,
u runs through Vn while x does. By assumption, f(u) ⊕ f(u ⊕ γi) runs through the
values zero and one an equal number of times while u runs through Vn. Consequently
ψ(x)⊕ψ(x⊕δi) runs through the values zero and one an equal number of times while
x runs through Vn. That is, ψ(x) satisfies the SAC. ut
Note that the algebraic degree, the nonlinearity and the balancedness of a func-
tion is unchanged under a nondegenerate linear transformation of coordinates [MS90,
SZZ93a]. In addition the number of nonzero vectors with respect to which the function
satisfies the propagation criterion is also invariant under the transformation [SZZ93a].
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In the case of S-boxes (tuples of functions), the profile of its difference distribution ta-
ble, which measures the strength against the differential cryptanalysis [BS91, BS93],
also remains invariant under such a transformation [SZZ93c]. Thus Theorem 1 pro-
vides us with a very useful tool to improve the strict avalanche characteristics of
cryptographic functions. In the following we consider two applications of the theo-
rem.
Application 1 Our first application shows that a SAC-fulfilling function on a higher
dimensional space can be easily obtained from a SAC-fulfilling function on a lower
dimensional space.
Let g(y1, . . . , ys) be a function on Vs that satisfies the SAC. Adding t dummy-
coordinates x1, . . . , xt into g, we obtain a function f on Vs+t, namely,
f(y1, . . . , ys, x1, . . . , xt) = g(y1, . . . , ys)
The t newly added coordinates have no influence on the output of f . Hence f does
not satisfy the SAC.
Let A be a nondegenerate matrix of order s+ t. Assume that each row γi of A can
be written as γi = (βi, αi), where W (βi) = 1, βi ∈ Vs and αi ∈ Vt. Let x = (x1, . . . , xt),
y = (y1, . . . , ys) and z = (y, x). Then we have f(z) ⊕ f(z ⊕ γi) = g(y) ⊕ g(y ⊕ βi).
This shows that f(z)⊕ f(z ⊕ γi) is balanced for γi, i = 1, . . . , s + t. By Theorem 1,
ψ(z) = f(zA) satisfies the SAC.







where I denotes the identity matrix, 0 denotes the zero matrix, and Q is a matrix
that contains precisely an one in each of its rows.
ψ and f have the same nonlinearity, algebraic degree, and balancedness as f(z)
does. The two functions also have the same number of nonzero vectors with respect
which they satisfy the propagation criterion. The net gain of ψ over f is the SAC.
However, it should be pointed out that for this particular example, the resulting
function ψ does not satisfy the propagation criterion with respect to vectors whose
entries are zeros except in the first and the (s + j)th, where 1 <= j <= t. This property
might be undesirable in certain applications. We can get around the problem by
selecting a nondegenerate matrix A that introduces more inter-dependencies among
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(2)
where B is an arbitrary matrix whose entries are taken from GF (2).
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Application 2 Let g0 and g1 be functions on Vt. Then f(y1, x1, . . . , xn) = (1 ⊕
y1)g0(x1, . . . , xt)⊕ y1g1(x1, . . . , xt) is a function on Vt+1. The truth table of f can be
obtained by concatenating the truth tables of g0 and g1. For this reason, we say that
f is the concatenation of g0 and g1. Similarly, we can define the concatenation of 2
s
functions on Vt. The result is a function on Vt+s. To simplify the representation of
the concatenation of 2s functions, we introduce the following notation.
For each vector δ = (i1, . . . , is) ∈ Vs, we define a function Dδ on Vs by
Dδ(y) = (y1 ⊕ ī1) . . . (ys ⊕ īs)
where y = (y1, . . . , ys) and ī denotes the binary complement of i, namely, ī = 1 ⊕ i.
For instance, when s = 2 we have D0,0(y1, y2) = (y1 ⊕ 1)(y2 ⊕ 1), and when s = 3 we
have D1,0,1(y1, y2, y3) = y1(y2 ⊕ 1)y3. Note that Dδ(y) = 1 if and only if y = δ.
Using this notation, the concatenation of 2s functions on Vt, g0,...,0, g0,...,1, . . .,





where x = (x1, . . . , xt). Note that each gδ is a function on Vt and is indexed by a
vector in Vs. Of particular interest is the concatenation of linear functions on Vt. In
Theorems 4 and 5 of [SZZ93b], the following result is proved:
Lemma 1 When t >= s and all gδ, δ ∈ Vs, are distinct nonzero linear functions on
Vt, the function f constructed by (3) is highly nonlinear and balanced. In addition, f
satisfies the propagation criterion with respect to all γ = (β, α), where β is a nonzero
vector in Vs and α is an arbitrary vector in Vt.
Let A be a nondegenerate matrix of order s + t. Suppose that the ith row γi of
A can be written as γi = (βi, αi) with βi 6= 0, where βi ∈ Vs and αi ∈ Vt. From
Lemma 1 we know that f satisfies the propagation criterion with respect to all rows
of A. By Theorem 1, ψ(z) = f(zA) satisfies the SAC. Note that the matrix A defined
by (1) or (2) satisfies the requirements.





where r is an arbitrary function on Vs.
3 A Set of Functions
In computer security practice, such as the design of S-boxes, we often consider a set of
functions. It is desirable that all component functions in a set simultaneously satisfy
the SAC. From Theorem 1 we can see that given a set of functions on Vn, {f1, . . . , fm},
if A is a nondegenerate matrix of order n such that fi(x)⊕ fi(x⊕ γj) is balanced for
every function fi and every row γj in A, then g1(x) = f1(xA), . . ., gm(x) = fm(xA) all
satisfy the SAC. The following theorem gives a sufficient condition for the existence
of such a nondegenerate matrix.
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Theorem 2 Let f1, . . ., fm be functions on Vn. Denote by B the set of nonzero
vectors γ in Vn such that fj(x)⊕ fj(x⊕ γ) is not balanced for some 1 <= j <= m, and
by |B| the number of vectors in B. If |B| < 2n−1, then there exists a nondegenerate
matrix A of order n with entries from GF (2) such that each ψj(x) = fj(xA) satisfies
the SAC.
Proof. We show how to construct a nondegenerate matrix A of order n, under the
condition that |B| < 2n−1. Denote by Sα1,...,αk the set of vectors consisting of all the
linear combinations of vectors α1, . . . , αk.
The first row of A, γ1, is selected from Vn excluding those in B and the zero vector,
i.e., from the vector set Vn −B − S0. There are 2n − |B| − 20 different choices for γ1.
The second row of A, γ2, is selected from the vector set Vn−B−Sγ1 . This guarantees
that γ2 is linearly independent of γ1. We have 2
n − |B| − 21 different choices for γ2.
In general, once the first k − 1 linearly independent rows γ1, . . ., γk−1 of A are
selected, the kth row γk, k <= n, will be selected from the vector set Vn−B−Sγ1,...,γk−1 .
This process ensures that γ1, . . ., γk are all linearly independent.
The number of choices for the last row γn is 2
n − |B| − 2n−1 = 2n−1 − |B| > 0.
Therefore, we can always find a nondegenerate matrix A such that fi(x)⊕ fi(x⊕ γj)
is balanced for every 1 <= i <= m and 1 <= j <= n. By Theorem 1, ψ1(x) = f1(xA), . . .,
ψm(x) = fm(xA) all satisfy the SAC. ut
As is discussed in Section 2, the transformation technique does not affect the
nonlinearity, the algebraic degree and the balancedness of the component functions
of an S-box. The profile of the difference distribution table of the S-box, and the
number of nonzero vectors with respect to which the component functions satisfy the
propagation criterion are not altered either. This technique has been successfully
applied in [SZZ93c] to design S-boxes that possess many desirable cryptographic
properties, which include the high nonlinearity, the SAC, the balancedness and the
robustness against differential cryptanalysis. As is shown below, the technique can
also be applied to other approaches to the construction of S-boxes.
Application 3 S-boxes based on permutation polynomials are studied in [Pie91,
NK92, Nyb92, Nyb93, BD93]. In general, these permutations do not satisfy the SAC.
Employing the transformation technique discussed above, the strict avalanche charac-
teristics of these permutations can be improved. In particular, with the permutations
constructed by the “cubing” method [Pie91, NK92, Nyb93], each component function
fj satisfies the propagation criterion with respect to all but one nonzero vectors in
Vn, where n >= 3 is odd. Note that |B| <= n. A component function fails to satisfy the
SAC if the Hamming weight of the nonzero vector with respect to which the propa-
gation criterion is not satisfied is one. If this is the case, by Theorem 2 we can use a
nondegenerate matrix to transform the component functions of such a permutation
so that they all satisfy the SAC.
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4 A Final Remark
In [SZZ93a], we have constructed highly nonlinear balanced functions on V2k+1 that
satisfy the propagation criterion of degree 2k, and highly nonlinear balanced func-




technique similar to that presented in this paper has played an important role in the
constructions.
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